All proper scoring rules incentivize an expert to predict accurately (report their true estimate), but not all proper scoring rules equally incentivize precision. Rather than consider the expert's belief as exogenously given, we consider a model where a rational expert can endogenously refine their belief by repeatedly paying a fixed cost, and is incentivized to do so by a proper scoring rule.
Introduction
In the context of decision theory, a scoring rule rewards experts for the accuracy of their predictions [Goo52, Bri50, Sav71] . In the context of a binary choice (e.g. "Will it rain tomorrow?") a scoring rule can be thought of as a function f : (0, 1) → R, where if a predictor reports a probability p of rain, then the predictor's reward is f (p) if it rains and f (1 − p) if it does not rain. 1 We consider settings in which there are two possible outcomes, so we will henceforth refer to scoring rules in terms of this function f .
Traditionally, scoring rules are concerned with incentivizing accurate reports. For example, a scoring rule is called proper if an expert is always incentivized to tell the truth, in the sense that reporting the predictor's true probability strictly maximizes the predictor's expected reward. Of course, there is an extraordinary amount of flexibility in selecting a proper scoring rule. For example, if a continuously differentiable scoring rule f : (0, 1) → R satisfies x f ′ (x) = (1 − x)f ′ (1 − x) and f ′ (x) > 0 for all x, then f is proper. Indeed, any increasing C 1 function on [ 1 2 , 1) can therefore be extended to a C 1 proper scoring rule on (0, 1) (see Corollary 2.4). Much prior work exists comparing proper scoring rules by various measures, e.g. [WMC + 96, GR07, DM14] , but there is little which formally analyze the extent to which proper scoring rules incentivize precision (see Section 1.2).
As a motivating example, consider the problem of guessing the probability that one of two competing advertisements will be clicked. Without any effort, an expert could choose not to even read the advertisements and guess that each is equally likely. But the expert is not exogenously endowed with this belief, they can also endogenously exert costly effort to refine their prediction. For example, the expert could read the ads and see which add they would click themselves, or poll members of their household for a few samples. A more ambitious expert could set up a crowdsourcing experiment on (say) Mechanical Turk, and pay users to see which link they would click. Any proper scoring rule will equally incentivize the expert to accurately report their resulting belief. But not all scoring rules equally incentivize the costly gathering of information so that this endogenously formed belief is precise.
This paper develops a clean model to formally measure the extent to which a scoring rule incentivizes precision in the binary case. Specifically, we consider a two-sided coin with bias drawn uniformly from (0, 1). Tomorrow the coin will be flipped, and the predictor will guess the probability that it lands heads. Today, the predictor can flip the coin any number of times, at cost c per flip. While certainly stylized, this model captures examples like the one above surprisingly well: tomorrow, a user will conduct a search and be shown the two advertisements (clicking one). Today, the predictor can run an experiment on Mechanical Turk and pay any number of workers c to choose between the two links. In this model, the key question addressed in our work is the following: which scoring rules best incentivizes the expert to produce a precise prediction?
Our Results
Our first main result is the existence of an incentivization index. Specifically, if Error c (f ) denotes the expected error that a rational expert makes when incentivized by scoring rule f with cost c per flip, we define an index Ind(f ) with the following remarkable property: for all respectful (see Definition 3.1) proper scoring rules f , д, Ind(f ) < Ind(д) implies the existence of a sufficiently small c 0 > 0 such that for all c ≤ c 0 , Error c (f ) < Error c (д). This is formally stated in Theorem 3.3. We defer to Theorem 3.3 a precise definition of this index, but remark here that it is not a priori clear that such an index should exist at all, let alone that it should have a closed form.
With an index in hand, we can now ask a well-defined optimization problem: which proper scoring rule minimizes the incentivization index? Our second main result nails down this scoring rule precisely, which we call д 1,Opt (see Theorem 4.3).
We also consider extensions to ℓ t h moments of error, where now Error ℓ c (f ) denotes the expected ℓ th power of the error that a rational expert makes when incentivized by scoring rule f with cost c per flip, and again derive an incentivization index Ind ℓ (f ) and an optimal scoring rule д ℓ,Opt . Some of these optimal rules have a particularly clean closed form (for example, as ℓ → ∞, the optimal rule pointwise converges to a polynomial), but many do not. We also prove, using techniques similar to the Weierstrass approximation theorem [Wei85] , that each of these rules can be approximated by polynomial scoring rules whose incentivization indices approach the optimum.
Finally, beyond characterizing the optimal rules, the incentivization indices themselves allow for comparison among popular scoring rules, such as logarithmic (f log (x) := ln(x)), quadratic (f quad (x) := 2x − (x 2 + (1 −x) 2 )), and spherical (f sph (x) := x/ x 2 + (1 − x) 2 ). We plot the predictions made by our incentivization index (which provably binds only as c → 0) for various values of c, and also confirm via simulation that the index seems to have bite for reasonable choices of c.
Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, [Cle02] was the first to consider scoring rules primarily as motivating the expert to seek additional information about the distribution before reporting their belief. [Cle02] proposes a quite general model, and focuses on simulations and examples. More recent work of [Tsa19] considers the opposite question to our work -what scoring rules provide as little incentive as possible for the expert to do more research (which helps elicit the expert's original belief)? Although thematically related, the model of [Tsa19] is significantly different than ours. [RS17] also consider scoring rules to incentivize experts, but in a different sense: their experts have exogenous beliefs (there is no costly effort), but seek to be more accurate than competing experts (rather than directly receive compensation from a scoring rule).
Our work also fits into the broad category of principal-agent problems. For example, works such as [CDP15, LC16, CIL + 18, CZ19] consider a learning principle who incentivizes agents to make costly effort and produce an accurate data point. Again, the models are fairly distinct, as these works focus on more sophisticated learning problems (e.g. regression), whereas we perform a more comprehensive dive to the problem of simply eliciting the (incentivized-to-be-precise) belief.
Proof. As 1−p p is strictly positive on ( 1 2 , 1), and f ′ (1 −p) is strictly (resp., weakly) positive almost everywhere on ( 1 2 , 1), we immediately conclude that f ′ (p) is also strictly (resp., weakly) positive almost everywhere on ( 1 2 , 1). Therefore, f is proper (resp., weakly proper) by Lemma 2.3 . □ This extension will be relevant when we design optimal scoring rules, so we provide a quick example to help parse it. Consider the function f (x) = x, which is strictly increasing on (0, 1 2 ]. Defining f ′ (x) = 1−x x · 1 = 1 x − 1 for x ∈ [ 1 2 , 1) results in f (x) = ln x − x + 1 + ln 2 (where 1 + ln 2 is the necessary constant to make f continuous at x = 1 2 ). Clearly f ′ (x) > 0 on (0, 1) (as promised by Corollary 2.4), so we have just constructed a proper scoring rule:
x for x ≤ 1 2 ln x − x + 1 + ln 2 for x ≥ 1 2 .
Put another way: every continuously differentiable proper scoring rule can be defined by first providing a strictly increasing function on (0, 1 2 ], and then extending it as in Corollary 2.4.
Expert Incentivization
The event we consider is a flip, tomorrow, of a biased coin. Initially, the expert believes the bias to be drawn uniformly from (0, 1). Today, the expert may pay c per flip to flip the coin any number of times. We consider a globally adaptive expert, who decides whether to flip the coin again based on whether the additional flip will increase their expected reward if they were to use the utilitymaximizing strategy after that flip (which depends on f , and the results of the previous flips) by more than the expected cost (c). 3 Nailing down the expert's optimal behavior as a function of c is extremely messy. As such, we derive our characterizations only up to o(1) terms (as c → 0). When c is large, one may reasonably worry that these o(1) terms render our theoretical results irrelevant. In Appendix E we simulate the expert's optimal behavior for large c, and confirm that our results hold qualitatively in this regime.
Finally, we need a measure to characterize the precision of an expert's prediction. We make the natural choice: the expected error of the expert's prediction from the true bias of the coin. 2 Almost everywhere on (0, 1) refers to the interval (0, 1) except a set of measure zero. 3 One consequence of our proof, explicitly stated in Lemma 3.11, is that for a broad class of proper scoring rules, such an expert's behavior is identical to that of a locally adaptive expert, who decides whether to flip the coin again based on whether the additional flip will increase their expected reward if they stopped immediately afterwards.
Definition 2.5. The expected error associated with a scoring rule f and cost c is Error c (f ) := E [|p − q|]. The expectation is taken over p drawn uniformly from (0, 1), and q the prediction of a globally-adaptive expert after flipping the coin (q is a random variable which depends on f , p, c).
We will also consider generalizations to other moments, and define Error ℓ
First Steps towards Understanding Incentivization
In this section, we'll state a few basic facts about the expert's expected reward, and how it changes with additional flips. We include a few short proofs in this section just to give intuition for how to use the aforementioned basic facts, but defer the rest to Appendix A. Our analysis will focus mostly on the reward function R f (·) rather than f (·), so the following fact will be useful:
Fact 2.6. For a weakly proper scoring rule f , we have
Again by Lemma 2.3, it follows that
After having flipped the coin n times, and seen k heads, the expert's belief is that tomorrow's flip will land heads with probability k +1 n+2 (Fact A.2). Lemma 2.7 observes how this expected reward evolves with an additional flip.
Lemma 2.7. Say that the expert has already flipped the coin n times, seeing k heads. Then their expected increase in reward for exactly one additional flip is k +1
Proof. This is a direct application of Fact A.2, which states that if the expert has flipped h heads of n coin, their guess at the coin's bias is h+1 n+2 . Currently, the expert believes the probability of heads to be k +1 n+2 . So their expected reward if they stop flipping now is exactly R( k+1 n+2 ). If they flip once more and stop, then with probability k +1 n+2 they will get a heads, updating their belief to k+2 n+3 , and yielding expected reward R( k +2 n+3 ). With probability n−k +1 n+2 they will get a tails, updating their belief to k +1 n+3 and yielding expected reward R( k +1 n+3 ). □ Lemma 2.7 suggests that the function R f (x) should be convex (otherwise, it seems that the expert may somehow lose expected reward by performing additional flips and getting a better estimate).
Lemma 2.8. Let f be any proper (resp., weakly proper) scoring rule. Then R f (x) is strictly convex (resp., weakly convex) almost everywhere on (0, 1). Corollary 2.9. Let f be a proper (resp., weakly proper) scoring rule. Then the expert's increased expected reward from an additional flip is strictly positive (resp., weakly positive).
Because we are interested in incentivizing the expert to take costly actions, the scale of a proper scoring rule will also be relevant. For example, if f is proper, then so is 2f , and 2f clearly does a better job of incentivizing the expert (Lemma 2.7). As such, we will want to first normalize any scoring rule under consideration to be on the same scale. A natural normalization is to consider two scoring rules to be on the same scale if their expected payout to the expert is the same.
Definition 2.10. We define Cost c (f ) to be the expected payout made to a globally-adaptive expert by scoring rule f (when the bias is drawn uniformly from (0, 1), and the expert may pay c per flip).
For proper (but not necessarily weakly proper) scoring rules, we show that the payout to a globally-adaptive expert approaches the payout to a perfect expert as c → 0. 
. Assuming that two potential scoring rules f , д have Cost c (f ) = Cost c (д) addresses one potential scaling issue. But there is another issue as well: whenever f is proper, the scoring rule 2f − 1 is also proper, and again clearly does a better job incentivizing the expert (again directly by Lemma 2.7). As such, we will also normalize so that R f (x) ≥ 0 for all x: the expert's expected reward is always non-negative if they are perfect. We conclude this section with a few equivalent conditions for this, and a statement of what it means to be normalized. Lemma 2.11. For a continuously differentiable (weakly) proper scoring rule f ,
is non-decreasing on (1/2, 1), and non-increasing on (0, 1/2). This means that it is
For any weakly proper scoring rule f :
, and that a perfect expert gets non-negative expected reward. It also implies that an expert who flips zero coins gets zero expected reward.
Proof. Simply combine Definition 2.13 and Lemma 2.12. □
An Incentivization Index
Here, we prove our first main result: an incentivization index to characterize the expert's expected error. The main result of this section is the following theorem, which holds for scoring rules that we term respectful. (1) R ′′ is strongly convex on (0, 1). That is, for some a > 0, R ′′ (x) ≥ a on (0, 1).
(2) R ′′′ is Riemann integrable on any closed interval of (0, 1). 4 (3) There exists t > 1 4 , and c 0 > 0 such that for all c ∈ (0, c 0 ), we have
The first two bullets should seem standard, and will be easy to verify for simple closed-form scoring rules. We elaborate on the third bullet immediately in Section 3.1, but here is intuition for why it is relevant: when c is the cost of flipping a coin, the bullet asserts that for c small enough, R ′′ does not change too quickly (except possibly near zero and one). Note that the particular choice of 0.16 is not special, and could be replaced with any constant < 1/6. Definition 3.2 (Incentivization Index). We define the incentivization index of a scoring rule f :
More generally, for any ℓ ≥ 1:
Theorem 3.3. If f is a respectful, continuously differentiable proper scoring rule, then:
is the ℓ t h moment of the standard normal distribution, then:
Intuitively, the incentivization index captures the expert's error as c → 0. More formally, for any two respectful proper scoring rules f , д, Ind(f ) < Ind(д) implies that there exists a sufficiently small c 0 > 0 such that Error c (f ) < Error c (д) for all c ≤ c 0 . As previously referenced, Theorem 3.3 says nothing about how big/small this c 0 might be, although simulations in Appendix E confirm that it does not appear to be too small for typical scoring rules.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 immediately below, we confirm that most natural scoring rules are respectful (which is mostly a matter of parsing the third bullet). In Sections 3.2 through 3.7 we outline our proof, providing the key steps as technical lemmas. Complete proofs of these lemmas can be found in Appendix B.
Respectful Scoring Rules
We state several sufficient conditions for a scoring rule to be respectful, confirm that typical scoring rules are respectful, and provide a brief discussion. Claim 3.4. If Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 3.1 holds and |R ′′′ (x)| is bounded on (0, 1) then f is respectful.
This should be clear: take c to be small enough such that c −.16 times the lower bound on R ′′ exceeds the upper bound on |R ′′′ |. Scoring rules such as the quadratic scoring rule and the spherical scoring rule satisfy the hypotheses of Claim 3.4. One well-known generalization of the quadratic scoring rule is the Tsallis rule [Tsa88]. This rule, parametrized by γ > 1, is defined to be the scoring rule f for which R f (x) = x γ + (1 − x) γ . When γ = 2, this yields the quadratic scoring rule.
For γ ≥ 3, it is evident that the Tsallis rule satisfies the hypotheses of Claim 3.4. However, this is not so for γ < 3 (except for γ = 2). Perhaps more importantly, the logarithmic scoring rule does not satisfy Claim 3.4 either. This motivates the following result.
Claim 3.5. Suppose that Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 3.1 are satisfied. Suppose further that R ′′′ is bounded on any closed sub-interval of (0, 1), and that there exist constants k 0 and r such that lim x →0 x r R ′′′ (x) = k. Then f is respectful.
The logarithmic scoring rule satisfies the hypotheses of Claim 3.5 (r = 2 and k = −1). The Tsallis rule with γ < 3 (and γ 2) also satisfies these hypotheses (r = 3 − γ and k = γ (γ − 1)(γ − 2)). The proof of Claim 3.5 is more involved, and deferred to Appendix B.
We briefly discuss what sorts of proper scoring rules aren't respectful. One way a scoring rule can be disrespectful is if R ′′ grows extremely quickly near zero (e.g. R ′′ (x) = e 1/x ). Such functions, however, are outside the scope of this entire exercise because they are not normalizable. That is, such R have ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx = ∞, and provide infinite expected payment to the expert. So this "limitation" of respectfulness is more of a restatement of normalizability.
Another way a scoring rule could be disrespectful is if R ′′ is not bounded away from zero. For example: R ′′ (x) = x − 1 2 2 or R ′′ (x) = x(1 −x). If R ′′ remains "very flat" near 0 for a "large interval", then Ind ℓ (f ) is infinite anyway. This implies that we should expect the error to be a larger order of magnitude than c −ℓ/4 , and for such functions to not incentivize precision well at all (although we do not explicitly prove this). This makes sense: if R ′′ (x) ≈ 0, then the expert gains ≈ 0 by flipping the coin to refine their current belief (Lemma 2.7). It is also possible that R ′′ is not bounded away from zero, but also not "very flat". We conjecture that Theorem 3.3 does hold for such functions, but that our approach does not establish this. While it is possible to come up with such functions (e.g., the two above) which elude Theorem 3.3's precise statement, this does not affect commonly-studied scoring rules, nor the scoring rules designed in this paper (sometimes leaning on Theorem 6.1).
Finally, as with any exercise in analysis, there are continuous functions that behave erratically near zero, such as R ′′ (x) = sin 1
x + sin 1 1−x + 3. While it may or may not be the case that Theorem 3.3 extends to such functions, this does not seem particularly relevant.
Proof Outline of Theorem 3.3
We provide below an executive overview of our approach. The concrete steps are separated out as formally-stated technical lemmas in the following sections, with proofs deferred to Appendix B. Before beginning, we highlight the main challenge. If we were just trying to upper bound the expected error, we could rely on simple Chernoff and union bounds. But we don't just want upper bounds, we want to really understand precisely the expected error. Anti-concentration bounds such as Berry-Esseen address this issue, but applied naively would simply tell us that the expected error as c → 0 is also 0 (which holds for every proper scoring rule, and doesn't distinguish among them). So the main difficulty is that not only are we looking for two-sided bounds on the error, which approaches zero, but we are specifically looking to understand very precisely the rate at which the error approaches zero (and not just the order of magnitude, but the constant multiple of c −1/4 ). This difficulty motivates the need for the technical lemmas stated in this section to be unusually precise.
Our executive outline is as follows:
• All of our analysis first considers a locally-adaptive expert, who flips the coin one additional time if and only if the expected increase in reward from that single flip exceeds c. • Our first key step, Section 3.3, provides an asymptotic lower bound on the number of times an expert flips the coin, for all respectful f . • Our second key step, Section 3.4, provides a coupling of the expert's flips across all possible true biases p. This will be helpful in proving uniform convergence bounds over all p, because we can define an "unlikely event" to occur independently of p. • Our third key step, Section 3.5, provides tight bounds on the number of flips by a locallyadaptive expert, up to (1 ± o(1)) factors. Note that the first three steps have not referenced an error measure at all, and only discuss the expert's behavior. • Our fourth key step, Section 3.6, shows how to translate the bounds in Section 3.5 to tight bounds on the error of a locally-adaptive expert, again up to (1 ± o(1)) factors. • Finally our last step, Section 3.7, shows that the globally-adaptive expert behaves nearlyidentically to the locally-adaptive expert, up to an additional o(1) factor of flips.
We now proceed to formally state the main steps along this outline, recalling that we first consider a locally-adaptive expert.
Step One: Lower Bounding the Expert's Flips
We begin with Claim 3.6, which relates the expert's expected reward from one additional flip to R ′′ . Below, we let Q(n) denote the random variable which is the predictor's belief after n flips.
Claim 3.6. Let ∆ n+1 (q) := E[R(Q(n + 1))|Q(n) = q] − R(q) be the expected increase in the expert's reward (not counting the paid cost c) from the n + 1-th flip of the coin, given current belief Q(n) = q. Then there exist c 1 , c 2 ∈ [q − 1/n, q + 1/n] such that:
A locally-adaptive expert decides to flip the coin for the n + 1-th time if and only if ∆ n+1 ≥ c. Assuming that R ′′ is bounded away from zero (Condition 1 in Definition 3.1), this lets us state a simple lower bound on the number of times the expert flips the coin.
Claim 3.7. For all f such that (R f ) ′′ is bounded away from zero, there exists α, c 0 such that the expert is guaranteed to flip the coin at least 1 α c 1/3 times for all c ≤ c 0 .
Observe that Claim 3.7 alone immediately provides an asymptotic upper bound on the expert's error. Recall, again, that we don't just want to bound the expert's error, but analyze it precisely.
Step Two: Characterizing Extreme Cases
The next step in our analysis is to try and reason that, with very high probability, the expert's belief after flipping the minimum number of times guaranteed by Claim 3.7 is extremely close to the true value of p. Again, note that proving this claim does not establish precisely what that error is, but it will let us reason about how many additional flips the expert will choose to make.
In order to uniformly bound, over all p, the probability of an extreme event, it will be helpful to couple the coin flips in the following manner: rather than first drawing drawing p and then flipping coins, it will be convenient to first draw a bias r i ∈ [0, 1] which is necessary for coin i to be heads. Formally:
(1) Generate an infinite sequence r 1 , r 2 , . . . of uniformly random numbers in [0, 1].
(2) Choose p uniformly at random from [0, 1].
(3) For each n, coin n comes up heads if and only if r n ≤ p.
Under this sampling procedure, Q p (n) :=
n+2 is the expert's estimate after flipping n coins, where h p (n) is the number of heads in the first n flips, if p is the value chosen in step (2).
We now define the event Ω N for each N ≥ 1. Intuitively, Ω N holds when, no matter what p is chosen in step (2), the expert's Bayesian estimate of p never strays too far from p at any time after having flipped N coins. More formally, we define the complement of Ω N as
The expression on the right-hand side of the inequality can be rewritten as j n 1 − j n n · n .01 2 .
The radical expression represents the order of the expected difference between Q j/n (n) and j n . So intuitively, Ω N fails to hold if the actual difference is significantly larger than the expected difference. The purpose of defining Ω N is that if Ω N holds, then we can make assumptions that simplify our analysis. On the other hand, we find that Ω N fails to hold with small enough probability that such cases do not affect our asymptotic results. Claim 3.8 is the main property we desire from Ω N , and Claim 3.9 lower bounds the probability of Ω N .
Claim 3.8. The exists a sufficiently large N 0 such that for all
Claim 3.9.
Pr
The important takeaway from Claim 3.8 is that when Ω N holds, the expert's prediction is close to p for all n ≥ N , and also that the closeness shrinks with n. The important takeaway from Claim 3.9 is just that the probability of Ω N is tiny.
Step Three: Nailing Down the Expert's Flips
Our next step is to nail down not just a lower bound, but a two-sided bound on the number of flips the expert chooses to make as a function of the true bias p. This will be significantly easier after assuming Ω N . We use the random variable n stop to denote the number of times that a locally-adaptive expert chooses to flip the coin. Proposition 3.9. Assume that Ω N holds for some N , and let t be as in Definition 3.1. There exists a constant γ and cost c 0 > 0 such that for all c ≤ c 0 and all p ∈ [2c t , 1 − 2c t ], we have
(
(1 + γc 1/300 ).
The bounds in Proposition 3.9 make intuitive sense in light of Claim 3.6. Roughly speaking, Claim 3.6 shows that after n flips, the expected gain in reward from one extra flip is ∆ n+1 ≈ p(1−p) 2n 2 R ′′ (p). The value of n for which this quantity first falls below c (the cost of another flip) is n =
The key facts about Proposition 3.9 for intuition are: (a) the upper and lower bounds mach up to a multiplicative (1 ± o(1)), (b) this o(1) factor is independent of p, and (c) the number of flips is (up to multiples of 1 ± o(1))
3.6.
Step Four: Translating n stop to Error Now that we have pinned down n stop quite precisely, we can translate these bounds into bounds on a locally-adaptive expert's expected error. Observe that the previous three steps made no reference whatsoever to the particular error form we care about, as it only bounds the number of flips made by a locally-adaptive expert. This step is the first time we invoke the particular form of error. Below, Err c (p) denotes a random variable equal to the locally-adaptive expert's error when the cost is c and the true bias is p (and the scoring rule f is implicit).
Lemma 3.10. Let ℓ ≥ 1 and µ ℓ :
be the ℓ th moment of a standard Gaussian. Let
where the o(1) term is a function of c (but not p) that approaches zero as c approaches zero.
Lemma 3.10 is the key (but far from only) step in translating Proposition 3.9 to tight bounds on the locally-adaptive expert's error. The intuition behind Lemma 3.10 is that the bounds above (up to the (1 ± o(1)) factors) are exactly the error one would expect from quantitative Central Limit Theorems after n stop flips (using the bound on n stop from Proposition 3.9).
Step Five: From Locally Adaptive to Globally Adaptive
Finally, we show how to extend our previous analysis from locally-adaptive experts to globallyadaptive experts. In particular, as long as the expected reward of a perfect expert is finite, we show essentially that the globally-adaptive expert does not pursue many more flips than a locally-adaptive expert, and therefore their error is comparable (up to (1 ± o(1)) factors).
Lemma 3.11. Assume f is respectful and normalizable (i.e.
where γ is as in Proposition 3.9. There exists a c 0 > 0 such that for all c ≤ c 0 , assuming Ω n stop and that 4c t ≤ Q(n stop ) ≤ 1 − 4c t , we have n д ≤ N .
Again, Lemma 3.11 is just one technical lemma to get from locally-adaptive to globally-adaptive experts, but it helps highlight the main step (the remaining work is to bound what happens when q is extremely close to 0 or 1, or Ω n stop fails, etc.).
This completes our outline of the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Finding Optimal Scoring Rules
Now that we have shown that the incentivization index characterizes how well any respectful scoring rule incentivizes a globally-adaptive expert to minimize error, we have a well-defined optimization problem: which normalized proper scoring rule has the lowest incentivization index (and therefore minimizes the expert's expected error)? Recall the necessary/sufficient conditions for a continuously differentiable and normalized scoring rule д(·) to be weakly proper. 6
So our goal is just to find the scoring rule which satisfies these constraints and minimizes the incentivization index:
As shown in Corollary 2.4, the equation xд ′ (x) = (1 − x)д ′ (1 − x) lets us extend д uniquely in a continuous manner to (0, 1) if we know д on [ 1 2 , 1). Thus, we can simply consider д on [ 1 2 , 1). For д ′ to be nonnegative everywhere, it suffices for it to be nonnegative on [ 1 2 , 1), because of the relation
. Also, observe that the integrand is symmetric about 1 2 ; this is clear from the fact that R ′′ is symmetric about 1 2 . This means that
dx .
6 Including weakly proper scoring rules in our optimization domain makes the analysis simpler. The optimal scoring rules are in fact strictly proper.
Thus, our question can be phrased as follows: find the continuously differentiable function д :
From this point, our problem is simply a continuous mathematical program. It is not obvious that the program should admit a closed-form solution, but it does. We defer all details to Appendix C, and just briefly note that we can formulate the problem exclusively as a function of д ′ , and then uniquely reconstruct д using д( 1 2 ) = 0. Once we have done this, we can take a Lagrangian relaxation by putting a multiplier on the constraint ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x)д ′ (x)dx = 1, and hope that the solution to the relaxation is continuous and satisfies д ′ (x) ≥ 0. While this is not guaranteed, it fortunately turns out to be the case. The main results of this section are:
(Note that κ ℓ is simply a normalization constant, so as to make
Theorem 4.3. The unique continuously differentiable normalized proper scoring rule which minimizes Ind ℓ (д) is:
For some choices of ℓ, the particular scoring rule д ℓ,Opt has an interesting closed form (see Section 5 below), but this is not true for all ℓ. Even in cases where the particular closed form is not illuminating, the fact that д ℓ,Opt even exists is already interesting, and the fact that Theorem 4.3 nails down the closed form allows us to compare other scoring rules to the optimum. We conclude with a remark, confirming that our analysis in Section 3 indeed is meaningful for all derived optimal scoring rules. A proof for ℓ ∈ [1, 8] is in Appendix B, and a proof for ℓ > 8 is in Appendix D. 
A corollary of Remark 4.4 is the following.
where f ranges over all normalized, respectful, continuously differentiable proper scoring rules. Let
where f ranges over all normalized, continuously differentiable proper scoring rules. Then:
(1) Error ℓ Opt = µ ℓ · 2 ℓ/4 · Ind ℓ Opt .
(2) For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 8, the first infimum is uniquely achieved by f = д ℓ,Opt .
(3) For ℓ > 8, no (respectful) function achieves the first infimum, but the infimum is reached in the limit by uniform approximations of д ℓ,Opt (which are normalized, respectful, and continuously differentiable).
Comparing Scoring Rules
In this section we compare various scoring rules by their incentivization indices, for various values of ℓ. Of particular interest are the values ℓ = 1 (expected absolute error), ℓ = 2 (expected squared error), and the limit as ℓ → ∞ (which penalizes bigger errors "infinitely more" than smaller ones, so this regime corresponds to minimizing the probability of being very far off).
Optimal Scoring Rules for Particular Values of ℓ
We begin by noting some values of ℓ for which the function д ℓ,Opt takes a nice closed form. ℓ = 1 happens to not be one such value. For ℓ = 2, 4, 8, the functions д ℓ,Opt can be written in terms of elementary functions on the entire interval (0, 1). For ℓ = 2, the closed form on (1/2, 1) is a polynomial, although the extension via Corollary 2.4 to (0, 1/2) is not. For ℓ = 8, the closed form on both (0, 1/2) and (1/2, 1) is a polynomial, although they are different. Interestingly, as ℓ → ∞, the closed form converges pointwise to a single polynomial. Specifically, for these values of ℓ:
For ℓ = 8: On (0, 1 2 ], we have
and on [ 1 2 , 1), we have
. Finally, as ℓ → ∞: on the entire interval (0, 1), д ℓ,Opt pointwise converges to
We refer to this last rule as д ∞,Opt . Interestingly, note that д ∞,Opt is smooth at 1 2 , a property that д ℓ,Opt lacks for any fixed ℓ (as can be seen by computing the limit of the second derivative as x approaches 1 2 from the left and from the right). A natural question to ask is, what infinitely differentiable normalized function minimizes Ind ℓ ? While (as we have shown by virtue of д ℓ,Opt being the unique minimizer) achieving an incentivization index equal to Ind ℓ (д ℓ,Opt ) with an infinitely differentiable scoring rule is impossible, it turns out that it is possible to get arbitrarily close -and in fact it is possible to get arbitrarily close with polynomial scoring rules. The main idea of the proof is to use the Weierstrass approximation theorem to approximate д ℓ,Opt with polynomials. See Appendix 6 for a full proof.
Ind ℓ (·) ℓ = 1 ℓ = 2 ℓ = 4 д log 0.260 0.0732 0.00644 д quad 0.279 0.0802 0.00694 д sph 0.296 0.0889 0.00819 д 1,Opt 0.253 0.0728 0.00719 д 2,Opt 0.255 0.0718 0.00661 д ∞,Opt 0.311 0.0968 0.00974 The corresponding entry is
Comparison of Incentivization Indices of Scoring Rules
We compare commonly studied scoring rules such as quadratic, logarithmic, and spherical, and refer to their normalizations as д quad , д log , д sph , respectively. Figure 1 states Ind ℓ (д) for various scoring rules д (the lower the better). Figure 1 lets us compare the performance of various scoring rules by our metric for any particular value of ℓ. However, as one can see, Ind ℓ decreases as ℓ increases. This makes sense, since Ind ℓ measures the expected ℓ-th power of error. For this reason, if we wish to describe how a given scoring rule performs over a range of values of ℓ, we need to normalize these values. We do so by taking the ℓ-th root and dividing these values by the ℓ-th root of the optimal (smallest) index (and take the inverse so that larger numbers are better). This gives us the following measure of scoring rule precision, which makes sense across different values of ℓ:
. Figure 2 , which shows values of this expression for a selection of scoring rules and values of ℓ, reveals some interesting patterns. Of the logarithmic, quadratic, and spherical scoring rules, the logarithmic scoring rule is the best for small values of ℓ, and is in fact near-optimal for ℓ ≈ 4. For intermediate values of ℓ, the quadratic scoring rule is best, and is near-optimal for ℓ ≈ 16. For large values of ℓ, the spherical scoring rule is the best of the three.
Below is a continuous version of Figure 2 . The chart shows how the numbers above vary as ℓ ranges from 1 to 200.
And below is a zoomed-in version where ℓ ranges from 1 to 10.
Almost-Optimal Incentivization Indices with Polynomial Respectful Scoring Rules
The main result of this section is the following theorem, stating that polynomial, 7 respectful proper scoring rules suffice to get arbitrarily close to the optimal incentivization index. Theorem 6.1. For ℓ ≥ 1 and ε > 0, there exists a respectful polynomial normalized proper scoring
The proof of Theorem 6.1 uses ideas from the Weierstrass approximation theorem. However, the Weierstrass approximation theorem gives a particular measure of "distance" between two functions, which does not translate to these functions having similar incentivization indices. So one challenge of the proof is ensuring convergence of a sequence of polynomials to д ℓ,Opt in a measure related to Ind ℓ . A second challenge is to ensure that all polynomials in this sequence are themselves proper, respectful scoring rules. Like previous technical sections, we include a few concrete lemmas to give a sense of our proof outline.
For example, one step in our proof is to characterize all analytic proper scoring rules (that is, proper scoring rules that have a Taylor expansion which converges on their entire domain (0, 1)). A necessary condition to be analytic is to be infinitely differentiable, which rules of the form д ℓ,Opt are not, for any fixed ℓ. We therefore seek to approximate such scoring rules with polynomial scoring rules (which are analytic), which are also respectful and proper.
As an example to help parse Theorem 6.2, the quadratic scoring rule has c 1 < 0, and c i = 0 for all other i. Using Theorem 6.2, we can conclude the following about (R f ) ′′ for any proper scoring rule f : Lemma 6.3. Let f : (0, 1) → R be analytic. Then f is a proper scoring rule if and only if (R f ) ′′ is not uniformly zero, nonnegative everywhere, and can be written as
Lemma 6.3 provides clean conditions on what functions (R f ) ′′ are safe to use in our sequence of approximations, and our proof follows by following a Weierstrass approximation-type argument while keeping track of these conditions. The rest of the details for the proof of Theorem 6.1 can be found in Appendix D. A. Omitted Proofs from Section 2 A.1. Some Mathematical Preliminaries
We will use the following mathematical facts throughout our proofs, and include them here for reference.
Proof. Consider computing the probability of the following event in two different ways: there are n + 1 values drawn independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1], x 1 , . . . , x n+1 . The event occurs if and only if the first k elements are all smaller than the (k + 1) st , which is smaller than all of the last n − k elements.
One way to compute this probability is to first sample x k +1 uniformly from [0, 1], and then compute the probability that each of the first k elements are all smaller, and each of the last n − k are all larger. This probability is exactly ∫ 1 0 x k (1 − x) n−k dx. Another way is to first draw the n + 1 values, and then sample a random permutation to map them to x 1 , . . . , x n+1 . Then for any n + 1 values, the event occurs if and only if the (k + 1) st smallest element is mapped to x k +1 , and then that the smallest k values are mapped to x 1 , . . . , x k . This happens with probability 1 n+1 / n k . □ Fact A.2. Say that the expert has flipped the coin n times, and k of them were heads. Then the expert believes that the probability of heads is k +1 n+2 .
Proof. This follows from an application of Bayes rule. The probability of seeing k of n heads, conditioned on the true bias being p is n k p k (1 − p) n−k . Therefore, the probability of seeing k of n heads (unconditioned) is n k ∫ 1 0 p k (1 − p) n−k dp = 1 n+1 (by Fact A.1). Therefore, the density that the true bias is p, conditioned on seeing k of n heads is (n + 1) n k p k (1 − p) n−k , and the probability of seeing heads on the next flip is:
A.2. Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We first prove that if f is weakly proper then it satisfies the two stated constraints. Suppose that f is weakly proper. It is clear that f satisfies the first equation: for all p, in order for r p (x) = p f (x) + (1 − p)f (1 − x) to have a maximum at x = p, its derivative
Suppose for contradiction that for some p ∈ (0, 1),
On that open interval, then, the sign of r ′ p (x) is the opposite of the sign of p − (1 − p) x 1−x -that is, negative when x < p and positive when x > p. But then r p (x) is strictly minimized, rather than maximized, at x = p on this interval, contradicting that f is weakly proper.
To prove the stronger claim when f is proper, assume for contradiction that f ′ (p) is not strictly positive almost everywhere. Then because f ′ (·) is continuous, there is an interval of non-zero length in which f ′ (x) = 0 on the entire interval. Let p lie on the interior of this interval. Equation (1) then establishes that r ′ p (x) is 0 in an interval around x = p, meaning that p is not the unique maximizer for r p (·), contradicting that f is proper.
Conversely, suppose that f satisfies the two stated constraints. We show that f is weakly proper by showing a stronger statement: that for all p, r p (x) weakly increases on (0, p] and weakly decreases on [p, 1). By the first constraint, (1) holds. By the second constraint, for all x, r ′ p (x) is either 0 or has the sign of p − (1 − p) x 1−x , i.e. positive if x < p and negative if x > p. This means that r p (x) is weakly increasing on (0, p] and weakly decreasing on [p, 1), and so attains a weak global maximum at x = p, as desired.
To prove the stronger claim when f ′ (x) > 0 almost everywhere, we show that r p (x) strictly increases almost everywhere on (0, p] and strictly decreases almost everywhere on [p, 1). Again, (1) holds, so by the second constraint we have that r ′ p (x) has the sign of p − (1 − p) x 1−x almost everywhere, i.e. positive if x < p and negative if x > p. Thus, r p (x) is strictly increasing almost everywhere on (0, p] and strictly decreasing almost everywhere on [p, 1), and so attains a strict global maximum at x = p, as desired. □
The final inequality also follows from Lemma 2.3. If we further assume that f is (strictly) proper, then we additionally get that R ′′ (x) > 0 almost everywhere by Lemma 2.3, as desired. □ Proof of Corollary 2.9. Observe that k+1
Proof of Proposition 2.10. First, we wish to argue that as c → 0, no matter the true bias, the number of flips any expert will choose to make approaches ∞. To see this, observe that after n flips, the expert's current belief will always be an integer multiple of 1 m+1 . So if c(m) := min k <n ≤m+1, and k,n
n+2 )}, then the expert will always flip the coin at least n times as long as c ≤ c(m). Observe also that the minimum is taken over finitely many terms, all of which are strictly positive, so c(m) is strictly positive. Therefore, for all n, there is a sufficiently small c(m) > 0 such that whenever the cost is at most c(m), the expert flips at least n times no matter the true bias. Note that while these calculations are done for an adaptive expert, they hold for a non-adaptive expert as well because the non-adaptive expert would want to flip at least n coins no matter the outcomes. Now, let's consider the expected reward for an expert who makes exactly n flips no matter what. For all k, such an expert sees k total heads with probability 1/(m + 1). And conditioned on seeing k heads, the expert's expert reward tomorrow is R( k+1 m+2 ). Therefore, we can conclude:
Lemma A.3. For all n, the expected reward after n coin flips is n k =0 R( k +1 n+2 )/(n + 1). Now, we want to understand the limt of this sum as n → ∞. Observe that for each n, the sum is a Riemann sum for the function R(x) on [0, 1] (i.e. each k +1 m+2 lies inside the interval [ k m+1 , k+1 m+1 ]). Therefore, the limit as n → ∞ is just the Riemann integral, and we get:
So now we can conclude that the non-adaptive expert gets expected payout ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx + o(1). As c → ∞, the number of flips n → ∞, and the expected payout as n → ∞ approaches ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx. For the adaptive experts, observe that by Lemmas 2.7 and 2.8 that as long as they flip the coin at least n times with probability 1, their expected reward is at least as large as if they flipped it exactly n times with probability 1. As their expected reward can certainly not exceed ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx (as this is the reward of a perfect expert who knows exactly the bias), their expected reward must also approach ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx as n → ∞ (and therefore as c → ∞ as well). □ Proof of Lemma 2.12. We have
where the last step follows by separating (1 − x)f (1 − x) into its own integral and substituting u = 1 − x. Now we integrate by parts, letting u = f (x) and dv = 2xdx, so that du = f ′ (x) and v = x 2 , to get
we obtain the first equality. To obtain the equality with the third expression, we use integration by parts again, letting u = x and dv = f ′ (x)dx, so that du = dx and v = f (x), to get that
B. Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Claim 3.5. Let r , k be as in Claim 3.5. If r ≤ 0 then the claim is uninteresting: R ′′′ is bounded on (0, 1) and so the statement is subsumed by Claim 3.4. The interesting case is when r > 0.
We first consider the case when r > 1. Note that lim x →0 R ′′ (x) = ∞. To see this, suppose for contradiction that this limit is finite. We may write
by L'Hôpital's rule, so lim x →0 xR ′′′ (x) = 0, contradicting that lim x →0 x r R ′′′ (x) 0. Now, the fact that lim x →0 R ′′ (x) = ∞ lets us apply L'Hôpital's rule:
On the other hand, R ′′′ is bounded on [δ, 1 − δ ] by assumption. To finish, let t as in Definition 3.1 equal 0.3. Assume c is small enough that the following conditions are satisfied:
Then the last condition of Definition 3.1 will be satisfied on [δ, 1 − δ ]; it will also be satisfied on [c .3 , δ ] for any c satisfying the second condition above, because on that interval we have
.
By symmetry of R ′′ about 1 2 (and antisymmetry of R ′′′ ) we have that the condition also holds on [1 − δ, 1 − c t ], as desired. Now we consider the case that r = 1. As above, we have lim x →0 R ′′ (x) = ∞. Proceeding similarly, we have
This means that there exists δ > 0 such that for all x ≤ δ we have x ln x R ′′′ (x ) R ′′ (x ) ∈ [0, 2] and so
x ln x . We finish as before. Finally, consider the case that 0 < r < 1. Let a be a lower bound on R ′′ , as in the statement of Claim 3.5. It suffices to show that for for c small enough, we have |R ′′′ 
if c is small enough that c −.01 ≥ |k |+1 a . (As before, we also need to make sure that c is small enough that the condition is satisfied on [δ, 1 − δ ].) This concludes the proof. □ Proof of Claim 3.6. Say h of the first n flips were heads, so q = h+1 n+2 . The expert's expected reward is R h+1 n+2 . The expert reasons: with probability q, the next coin will come up heads and my new estimate will be h+2 n+3 ; with probability 1 − q it will be come up tails and my new estimate will be h+1 n+3 . Therefore, the expert's expected increase in reward from flipping the n + 1-th coin is
Since R is twice differentiable, we may use Taylor's approximation theorem to write
for some c 2 ∈ h+1 n+2 , h+2 n+3 . When we plug these expressions into the formula for ∆ n+1 above, the zeroth-and first-order terms cancel. We are left with
2(n + 3) 2 (qR ′′ (c 1 ) + (1 − q)R ′′ (c 2 )).
Note that |c 1 − q| ≤ h+1 n+2 − h+1 n+3 ≤ 1 n , so c 1 ∈ [q − 1 n , q + 1 n ], and similarly for c 2 . This completes the proof. □ Proof of Claim 3.7. Suppose that R ′′ (x) ≥ a for all x ∈ (0, 1). By Claim 3.6 we have
Now, we have that 1 n+2 ≤ q ≤ n−1 n+2 , and q(1 − q) decreases as q gets farther from 1 2 . This means that
For fixed n and for 1 n ≤ p ≤ 1 − 1 n , this maximum divided by n p(1 − p) is maximized when p = 1 n (or p = 1 − 1 n ), in which case the ratio is 2(n−2) n−1 ≤ √ 2. Therefore we have
for n large enough. (Here we again use that p ≥ 1 n , so p(1 − p) is minimized at p = 1 n .) □ Proof of Claim 3.9. We have
Now, let G j/n (n) be the fraction of the first n coin flips that were heads (so G j/n (n) is an average of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables that are 1 with probability j n ). Note that Q j/n (n) is within 1 n of G j/n (n), and for large n we have 1 n ≤ √ j(n−j) 2n 1.49 for all j. This means that for large n, by the triangle inequality we have that if G j/n (n) − j n > √ j(n−j) n 1.49 then Q j/n (n) − j n > √ j(n−j) 2n 1.49 . Therefore, for large N we have
We bound each of these probabilities. Recall the following version of the Chernoff bound: for
We apply this to our random variables (so X = nG j/n (n) and µ = j). Assume j ≤ n 2 . Let δ = n −.49 n−j j . Then Pr X n − j n ≥ j(n − j) n −1.49 ≤ 2e −n .02 /6 .
If j ≥ n 2 , a symmetry argument yields the same result. Therefore, for sufficiently large N we have
Pr Ω N ≤ Proof of Proposition 3.9. We assume for convenience that t < 0.3 (which is safe, as Definition 3.1 holds for all t ≤ t ′ whenever it holds for t ′ ).
Let α be as in Claim 3.7. As before, let Q(n) be the predictor's estimate for the bias of the coin after n flips. Then for c small enough that 1 α c 1/3 ≥ N and c 1/30 ≤ 2 α , for n ≥ 1 α c 1/3 , we have
This follows from Claim 3.8, noting that if c 1/30 ≤ 2 α and n ≥ 1 α c 1/3 then 1 n ≤ p ≤ 1 − 1 n . Now, recall Claim 3.6:
In the remainder of this proof, what we essentially argue is that R ′′ on this interval is not too far from R ′′ (p), because of our bound on Q(n) as p plus or minus a small quantity.
We ask: for a given (possibly negative) ϵ, how far from R ′′ (p) can R ′′ (p + ϵ) be? Well, since R ′′′ is integrable, we have
wherep is defined to be the number on the interval between p and p + ϵ minimizing x(1 − x) (i.e. farthest from 1 2 ). . Then |R ′′′ (x)| ≤ rR ′′ (x). We use this fact to prove the following. Proof. We prove this for positive ϵ. The result follows for negative ϵ because if some R = R 1 is a counterexample for some negative ϵ 1 , then R = R 2 where R ′′′ 2 (p + x) := −R ′′′ 1 (p − x) for x ∈ [0, ϵ 2 ] serves as a counterexample for ϵ 2 := −ϵ 1 . (This is because R ′′ 2 (p + x) = R ′′ 1 (p − x) for any x ∈ [0, ϵ 2 ], by the fundamental theorem of calculus.) Additionally, we may assume that R ′′ (p) = 1, because if there is a counterexample function R = R 1 to the claim then R = R 2 where R 2 (x) = R 1 (x ) R ′′ (p) also serves as a counterexample.
We prove that
The left inequality suffices because 1 − e −x ≤ e x − 1 for all x, so in particular 1 − e r ϵ ≤ e −r ϵ − 1. We begin with the right inequality. Suppose for contradiction that R ′′ (p + ϵ) > e r ϵ . Let S be the set of points in [p, p + ϵ] where R ′′ (x) > e r (x −p) . Since S contains p + ϵ, it is nonempty; let p 1 = inf S . Since R ′′ is continuous, we have R ′′ (p 1 ) − e r (p 1 −p) = 0. Pick δ > 0 small enough that the set T of points x ∈ p 1 , p 1 + min(ϵ, 1 3r ) with R ′′ (x) − e r (x −p) > δ is nonempty. Let p 2 = inf T , so R ′′ (p 2 ) − e r (p 2 −p) = δ . Note that
It follows that R ′′′ (p 3 ) − re r (p 3 −p) ≥ δ p 2 −p 1 ≥ 2rδ for some p 3 ∈ [p 1 , p 2 ]. (Otherwise the value of the integral would be at most the integral of 2rδ from p 1 to p 2 , which is at most 2 3 δ , since p 2 − p 1 ≤ 1 3r .) Therefore, because |R ′′′ (x)| ≤ rR ′′ (x) for all x ∈ [p, p + ϵ], we have that
. But then we have that p 2 < p 3 and p 3 ∈ T , contradicting the definition of p 2 as the infimum of T .
The proof of the left inequality above proceeds similarly, but is not exactly analogous. Suppose for contradiction that t := R ′′ (p + ϵ) − e −r ϵ < 0. Define p 1 to be the supremum of points in [p, p + ϵ] where R ′′ (x) ≥ e −r (x −p) (so R ′′ (p 1 ) = e −r (p 1 −p) ). Then R ′′ (x) − e −r (x −p) is zero at x = p 1 and t at
which means that for some p 2 ∈ [p 1 , p + ϵ] we have that R ′′′ (p 2 ) + re −r (p 2 −p) ≤ t 2(p+ϵ −p 1 ) (otherwise the value of the integral would be at least t 2 ). Since
. This is a contradiction, since on the one hand we have p 2 > p 1 , but on the other hand p 1 was defined as the supremum of points where R ′′ (x) ≥ e −r (x −p) . This completes the proof. □ How large of an ϵ do we care about? The farthest that c 1 and c 2 can be from p is p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 + αc 1/3 ≤ 2 p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 , for small c. (This is because we assumed for convenience that t < 0.3, which means that p(1 − p) ≥ c .3 , so αc 1/3 ≤ p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 .) Therefore, by Claim B.1 we have
wherep is either p ± 2 p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 , whichever is farther from 1 2 . It is easy to check 8 that for small enough c we have that
≤ 2, and so we have
for small enough c, where β = 8α .49 . (Here we use that e x ≤ 1 + 2x for small positive x.) It follows, then, by Claim 3.6, that
2(n + 3) 2 R ′′ (p)(1 + βc 1/300 ). Note that since Q(n) ≥ p − p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 and 1 − Q(n) ≥ 1 − p − p(1 − p)(αc 1/3 ) .49 , we may write
for c small enough that the second-to-last step holds. (In the last step we use that t < 0.3.) A similar calculation shows that Q(n)(1 − Q(n)) ≤ p(1 − p)(1 + α .49 c .01 ) for c small enough. 9 Also note that n 2 ≤ (n + 3) 2 ≤ n 2 (1 + 4αc 1/3 ) 2 . Putting these approximations all together, we note that the c 1/300 approximation is the dominant one, which means that there is a constant γ such that p(1 − p)
2n 2 R ′′ (p)(1 + γc 1/300 ).
(2) Therefore, since the expert stops flipping when ∆ n+1 < c, we have
This holds for any
A note on terminology: We will sometimes say that a function д(c) is o(h(c)) uniformly over p. This means that д and h are implicitly functions of p as well, but that h(x ) д(x ) approaches zero uniformly in p (i.e. for all ϵ there exists c ϵ such that for all c ≤ c ϵ , we have h(x ) д(x ) < ϵ for all (relevant) values of p). So for instance, the o(1) in the statement of Lemma 3.10 is uniform in p.
To prove Lemma 3.10 we first prove the following general proposition.
Proposition B.2. Let X c,p and Y c,p be random variables taking values in [0, 1] for each real number c > 0 and p ∈ P c (some arbitrary set that depends on c). Let ℓ > 0. If lim c→0
Proof. The condition that X c,p , Y c,p ∈ [0, 1] is simply a convenient one to guarantee that all relevant expectations are finite. Now, for any a ∈ (0, 1), we have
where the inequality follows by a union bound.
We start with the first statement. Dividing Equation 3 by E X ℓ c,p , we have
The limit of
as c approaches zero is 0 by assumption, so for c small enough we have that
· 1 a ℓ ≤ a for all p ∈ P c . In other words, for every a there exists c a such that for all c ≤ c a we
(1−a) ℓ + a = 1, we have that for all ϵ > 0 there exists c ϵ such that for all c ≤ c ϵ and p ∈ P c we have that 1
This proves the first statement. As for the second statement, we divide Equation
as c approaches zero is 0 by assumption, so for c small enough we have
≤ a for all p ∈ P c . In other words, for every a there exists c a such that for
≤ 1. Since lim a→0 (1 − a) ℓ+1 = 1, we have that for all ϵ > 0 there exists c ϵ such that for all c ≤ c ϵ and p ∈ P c we have that 1 − ϵ ≤
This proves the second statement. □
We now prove Lemma 3.10.
Proof (of Lemma 3.10). Fix any c and p ∈ [2c t , 1 − 2c t ].
(1 − γc 1/300 ).
Let d 1 be the expert's error after n 0 flips, i.e. |Q(n 0 ) − p|. Let d 2 be the distance from their guess after n 0 flips to their guess after n stop flips. Then the expert's error after n stop flips lies between d 1 − d 2 and d 1 + d 2 by the triangle inequality. That is, we have
We will later prove the following claim:
That is, for all ϵ there exists c ϵ such that for all c < c ϵ , the fraction above is less than ϵ for all p ∈ [2c t , 1 − 2c t ].
Now, given this claim, observe that by the first statement of Proposition B.2 (with X c,p = d 1 and Y c,p = d 2 ) we have lim c→0
By the second statement of the claim (with X c,p = max(0, d 1 − d 2 ) and Y c,p = d 1 − max(0,
Note that the premise of the second claim holds for these X c,p and Y c,p , because Y c,p = d 1 − max(0, d 1 −d 2 ) ≤ d 2 and so certainly if lim c→0
By the squeeze theorem, it follows that
Note that this limit holds uniformly over p ∈ [2c t , 1 − 2c t ].
To complete the proof, we use the fact (proven in Claim B.4) that
(1 + o(1)).
We have
Therefore we have
We now prove Claim B.3 by approximately computing E d ℓ 1 | Ω N and E d ℓ 2 | Ω N . We begin with the former. Claim B.4.
Proof. We use the Berry-Esseen theorem, a result about the speed of convergence of a sum of i.i.d. random variables to a normal distribution. Theorem B.5 (Berry-Esseen theorem). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be i.i.d. random variables with E [X 1 ] = 0, E X 2 1 ≡ σ 2 > 0, and E |X 1 | 3 = ρ < ∞. Let Y = 1 n i X i and let F be the CDF of Y √ n σ . Let Φ(x) be the standard normal distribution. Then for all x we have
for some universal constant C independent of n and the distribution of the X i .
Define X i to be 1 − p if the expert flips heads (which happens with probability p) and −p if the expert flips tails (which happens with probability 1 − p). Let Y = i X i . Then σ = p(1 − p) and ρ = p(1 − p)(p 2 + (1 − p) 2 ) ≤ p(1 − p). Plugging in these X i and n = n 0 into the Berry-Esseen theorem, we have
Now, we want to approximate E d ℓ 1 = E |Q(n 0 ) − p| ℓ . Note that Q(n 0 ) is within 1 n 0 of Y + p, the number of heads flipped divided by n 0 . This means that Y − 1 n 0 ≤ Q(n 0 ) − p ≤ Y + 1 n 0 . For this reason, we focus on computing E |Y | ℓ and subsequently correct for this small difference.
Observe that
Now, observe on the other hand that
where Z is a random variable drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 n 0 . Now we ask: how different is this second quantity (the integral involving Φ) from the first one (the integral involving F )?
The answer is, not that different. Indeed, as we derived, F
are both e −n Ω(1) 0 . (For Φ this follows by concentration of normal distributions; the claim for F follows from Claim 3.9, realizing the fact that there is nothing special about the 0.49 in the exponent except that it is less of E |Z | ℓ . Now, since p(1 − p) ≥ c t ≥ c .3 and n 0 ≥ 1 α c 1/3 , we have that p(1 − p) ≥ (αn 0 ) −.9 . It is easy to check that setting any r > 1 2 − 1 20ℓ shows that
where the o(1) depends only on c, not on p. Note that E |Z | ℓ = Θ p(1−p) n 0 ℓ/2
= ω 1 n ℓ 0 uniformly over p. This means that 1
and thus
By the first statement of Proposition B.2 (with X c,p = |Y | and Y c,p = 1 n 0 ), we have that
uniformly over p. By the second statement (with X c,p = max 0, |Y | − 1 n 0 and Y c,p = |Y | − max 0, |Y | − 1 n 0 ), we have that Finally, note that
Since 0 ≤ E d 1 | Ω N ≤ 1 and Pr Ω N = e −n Ω(1) 0 (where the Ω(1) does not depend on p), we
. Applying Proposition B.2 in the same way as earlier, we find that E d ℓ 1 | Ω N = E d ℓ 1 (1 + o(1)) = E |Z | ℓ (1 + o(1) ). We know that E |Z | ℓ = µ ℓ p(1−p) n 0 ℓ/2 . This completes the proof. □
We can now prove Claim B.3.
Proof (of Claim B.3). Let k = n stop − n 0 . Define {Y i } k i=0 as follows: Y 0 = 0 and for i > 0, Y i is either Y i−1 + 1 − p (if the n 0 + i-th flip is heads, i.e. with probability p) or Y i−1 − p (if the n 0 + i-th flip is tails, i.e. with probability 1 − p. Note that {Y i } is a martingale. Now, observe that for any 0 ≤ i ≤ k, we have
This is because (n 0 + 2)Q(n 0 ) is one more than the number of heads in the first n 0 flips and (n 0 + i + 2)Q(n 0 + i) is one more than the number of heads in the first n 0 + i flips. Thus,
Here, the last inequality follows from the fact that the arithmetic mean of max i |Y i | and kd 1 is less than or equal to the ℓ-power mean (since ℓ ≥ 1). Now, it is clear that 2 ℓ−1 k ℓ n ℓ E d ℓ 1 = o(E d ℓ 1 ), since k = o(n 0 ) by Proposition 3.9. We now show that 2 ℓ−1
. We make use of a tool called the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality.
, is equal to
Note that [Y ] is a random variable, not a number.
Theorem B.7 (Burkholder-Davis-Gundy ineqality). Let ℓ ≥ 1. There is a constant C ℓ such that for every martingale
We wish to bound E max k i=0 |Y i | ℓ above. To do so, we bound E [Y ] ℓ/2 above. Observe that [Y ] is a sum of k independent random variables that are each either p 2 (with probability 1 − p) or (1 − p) 2 (with probability p).
The last line comes from a Chernoff bound. In particular, we have that Pr [[Y ] ≥ µ(1 + δ )] ≤ e −δ 2 µ/(2+δ ) ≤ e −δ µ/2 for δ ≥ 2. Setting δ = x 2/ℓ µ − 1 gives us the expression above. Now, we can bound the integral as follows:
Note that B(µ) is continuous, converges on [0, ∞), and approaches zero as µ → ∞. It follows that B(µ) is bounded on [0, ∞); in other words, our integral is O(1) (i.e. possibly depends on ℓ but is at most a constant for fixed ℓ). Therefore, we have
Therefore, we have that E d ℓ 2 = o(E d ℓ 1 ). By the same reasoning as in the proof of Claim B.4, it dx .
Proof (of Theorem B.8). Let N = 1 α c 1/3 , i.e. a large enough function of c that it is guaranteed that the expert flips the coin at least N times. We have
We wish to compute the limit of this quantity as c approaches zero. Note that
This is because Err c (p) is bounded between 0 and 1 and Pr Ω N = O(e −N .01 ) = O(e −Ω(c −1/300 ) ), which goes to zero faster than c −ℓ/4 goes to infinity. Therefore we have
(We may ignore the Pr [Ω N ] term above because it approaches 1 in the limit.) We may write this quantity as
Let us focus on the second summand. Let p ∈ [0, 2c t ] ∪ [1 − 2c t , 1]. We assume p ∈ [0, 2c t ]; the other case is analogous.
We consider two sub-cases: p ∈ [0, αc 1/3 ] and p ∈ [αc 1/3 , 2c t ]. First suppose that p ∈ [c 1/3 , 2c t ]. Note that since Ω N holds, we have for all n ≥ N that
This in particular is true of n = n stop , so
since t > 1 4 and so t 2 + .49 3 > 1 4 . Now suppose that p ∈ [0, αc 1/3 ]. Recall the notation Q p (n) from the discussion preceding the definition of Ω N . For any n ≥ N , we have
This means that
so we can ignore this summand. Therefore, we have
From Lemma 3.10, we have that
By the squeeze theorem, we conclude that.
□
Below is our proof of Lemma 3.11, followed by a proof of Theorem 3.3. Our approach will be to compare the behavior of a locally adaptive expert to that of a globally adaptive one. We will assume that the experts observe the same stream of coin flips (each heads with probability p unknown to the experts) but that they may decide to stop at different times. As before, we will let Q(n) = h+1 n+2 where h is the number of the first n flips to have come up heads; since the experts see the same coin flips, we do not need to distinguish between Q(n) for the locally adaptive expert and for the globally adaptive expert. We will let n l and n д be the number of times the locally and globally adaptive experts flip the coin, respectively (so n д ≥ n l ). (We used the notation n stop in place of n l in Proposition 3.9.) Let t be as in the definition of respectful scoring rules, and in particular we will assume that t < 0.3 as before (for any t that witnesses that a scoring rule is respectful, any smaller t > 1 4 also works).
The bulk of the proof of Theorem 3.3 has already been completed, if we think of Theorem B.8 as a step in the proof. The bulk of the remainder is proving the following lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.11. Suppose that the globally adaptive expert flips the coin N times. We show that they do not flip the coin another time.
By definition of Ω n l , we have that
It is easy to check that because n l = Ω(c −1/3 ) (by Claim 3.7) and 4c t ≤ Q(n l ) ≤ 1 − 4c t (so Q(n l ), 1−Q(n l ) = Ω(n −.9 l )), the above relationship between Q(n l ) and p implies that 2c t ≤ p ≤ 1−2c t . This allows us to use some results from our analysis of locally adaptive experts. In particular, by Equation 2 in the proof of Proposition 3.9, we have that
Conditional on Ω N (and by definition Ω n l implies Ω N ), we also have p(1 − p)
2N 2 R ′′ (p)(1 + γc 1/300 ). In particular this means that
for c small enough. This means that if n l N 2 ≤ 1 1+6γ c 1/300 then ∆ N +1 ≤ (1 − 2γc 1/300 )∆ n l +1 < c(1 − 2γc 1/300 ). Furthermore, for any n ≥ N we will have ∆ n+1 < c(1 − 2γc 1/300 ).
However, this does not mean that the globally adaptive expert won't flip the coin for the N + 1-th time, because they don't know that Ω n l is true. From the expert's perspective, if they knew Ω n l (or even Ω N ) to be true, they would stop flipping the coin; but perhaps they should keep flipping the coin because of the outside chance that Ω N is false.
This turns out not to be the case, because the probability that Ω N is false is so small. In particular, from the expert's perspective, if Ω N being false, they cannot achieve reward better than the expectation of R(p) conditional on the coins they've flipped and on Ω N being false. We show that if the scoring rule f is normalizable (i.e. ∫ 1 0 R(x)dx is finite), then this quantity isn't too large. In particular, we show the following: Claim B.9. Let H N be the random variable corresponding to the number of heads flipped in the first N flips. Then for any 3c t N ≤ h ≤ (1 − 3c t )N , we have
Let us consider the expectation conditioned on p < 1 2 . Consider the distribution D of p conditioned on Ω N , H N = h, and p < 1 2 . Consider also the uniform distribution D ′ on [0, c t ]. We claim that D stochastically dominates D ′ , i.e. Pr x ←D [x ≤ y] ≤ Pr x ←D ′ [x ≤ y] for all y. To see this, observe that the PDF of D is an increasing function on [0, c t ]. This is because D on [0, c t ] is a constant multiple of the distribution D ′′ of p conditioned on Ω N , H N = h, and p ≤ c t ; but in this case the condition Ω N is redundant because if p ≤ c t then Ω N holds. So D ′′ is the distribution of p conditioned on H N = h and p ≤ c t . Clearly the PDF of D ′′ increases on [0, c t ] (because the expert starts with uniform priors and updates more strongly on against values of p farther from h+1 N +2 , which is greater than 2.9c t for c small enough). Now, the expectation of
On the other hand, the actual expectation of R(p) (i.e. with p drawn from D) is necessarily smaller. This is because R is convex and symmetric about 1 2 , meaning that R is decreasing on (0, 1 2 ). Since D stochastically dominates D ′ , we conclude that
The same inequality holds conditional instead on p > 1 2 , which concludes the proof. □ From the expert's perspective, this means that if they flip the coin for the N + 1-th time, then:
• In the case that Ω N is true, the best case is that they never flip the coin again, in which case they will pay a total cost of c and get expected reward at most c(1 − 2γc 1/300 ). • In the case that Ω N is false, the best case is that they get reward 2
In other words, the expert's expected reward if they flip the coin for the N + 1-th time and pursue the optimal strategy from there is at most
The first step is nontrivial: it uses the fact that the probability that the expert assigns to Ω N after the first N flips is O(e −N .01 ). This doesn't immediately follow from Claim 3.9 because the claim only states that the prior probability of Ω N , i.e. before any flips, is O(e −N .01 ). To see that the posterior probability (after the first N flips) is also of this order, we first observe that the posterior probability cannot depend on the order of the flip outcomes; this is apparent from the definition of Ω N . However, perhaps the number of heads, i.e. the value of H N , affects the posterior probability
of Ω N . This may be so, but it cannot increase the probability by more than a factor of N + 1. That is because the prior for H N is uniform over {0, . . . , N }. 10 Now, the quantity on the right is negative for c small enough, so the expert will not flip the N + 1-th coin. This proves the claim. □
The following corollary is essentially identical to Proposition 3.9 but for globally adaptive experts.
Corollary B.10. Assume that Ω N holds for some N . For sufficiently small c, for all p ∈ [8c t , 1−8c t ], we have p(1 − p)R ′′ (p)
2c
(1 + 14γc 1/300 ).
Proof.
Because Ω N holds for some N , for sufficiently small c the fact that p ∈ [8c t , 1 − 8c t ] implies that Q(n l ) ∈ [4c t , 1 − 4c t ]. This means that we may apply Lemma 3.11 to say that n д ≤ N . 10 For any h ∈ {0, . . . , N }, the prior probability that H N = h is given by ∫ 1 p=0 N h p h (1 − p) N −h dp, and this integral evaluates to 1 N +1 (see Fact A.1).
Consequently we have that
(1 − γc 1/300 ) ≤ n l ≤ n д ≤ N = (1 + 6γc 1/300 )n l
(1 + 14γc 1/300 ) for c small enough. Therefore we have
□
Theorem 3.3 follows as a simple corollary.
Proof (of Theorem 3.3). The lemma analogous to Lemma 3.10 but for expected globally adaptive error, and for p ∈ [8c t , 1 − 8c t ], follows immediately from Corollary B.10. This is because the proof of Lemma 3.10 makes no assumptions about the specific value of γ (other than that it is positive), which means that the proof goes through just as well for 14γ in place of γ . Theorem 3.3 follows from this fact exactly in the same way that Theorem B.8 followed from Lemma 3.10. □
C. Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Letting h = д ′ and noting that we can uniquely reconstruct д from h using д 1 2 = 0, we find that we are looking for the continuous function h :
One such function (which will turn out to be the only continuous one) is given as per the following lemma. 
It suffices to show that among all h satisfying ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x)h(x)dx = 1,h minimizes χ (h). This is because among such h, the second summand in the definition of χ is always zero. In fact, we prove something stronger:h minimizes χ , among all functions from [ 1 2 , 1) to R. To show this, it suffices to show that for every x ∈ [ 1 2 , 1), the value y that minimizes
is y =h(x). The derivative with respect to y of this expression is −ℓ
which is an increasing function of y (since y −(ℓ/4+1) is a decreasing function of y and −ℓ 4 (x(1−x) 2 ) ℓ/4 is negative). It is equal to 0 precisely when
It remains only to note that ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x)h(x)dx = 1, and this follows immediately from the definition ofh and κ ℓ . □ Proof of Corollary 4.2. Suppose for contradiction that there is another continuous function h satisfying the above properties that achieves the minimum. Then χ (ĥ) = χ (h), with χ as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, sinceh minimizes χ and the second summand in the definition of χ is zero for bothĥ andh. In particular, we have that χ (ĥ) − χ (h) = 0, i.e.
Let ∆(x) be the integrand. Note that ∆ is always nonnegative, and is zero precisely for those values of x whereĥ(x) =h(x) (since, as we showed earlier, y =h(x) is the unique value minimizing
Sinceĥ h , ∆ is positive at some x 0 ; say ∆(x 0 ) = y 0 . Also, note that ∆ is continuous becauseĥ andh are continuous. This means that for some δ > 0, 
which extends to the stated function д ℓ,OPT by the fundamental theorem of calculus. The constant we want to add (upon taking the antiderivative) is zero so that д ℓ,OPT 1 2 = 0. We need to check that д ℓ,OPT is continuously differentiable at 1 2 , which means checking thath is continuous at 1 2 when extended to (0, 1). This is indeed the case because lim
Finally, д ℓ,OPT is the unique continuous normalized minimizer because its derivative is unique, by Corollary 4.2. Note that д ℓ,OPT is in fact strictly proper sinceh(x) is positive on [ 1 2 , 1). □
We finish by noting that for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 8, the incentivization index really is meaningful for these optimal functions when -that is, that д ℓ,OPT is respectful for each ℓ ∈ 
First note that R ℓ,OPT (henceforth we will simply write R) is strongly convex. Since R ′′ is symmetric, it suffices to show this on (0, 1 2 ]. We have 1 − x ≥ 1 2 on this interval, and x (ℓ−8)/(ℓ+4) is bounded away from zero when x ≤ 8. Next, the fact that R ′′′ is Riemann integral on any closed sub-interval of (0, 1) is evident. Finally, there are constants k 0 and r such that lim x →0 x r R ′′′ (x) = k: in particular, r = 12 ℓ+4 and k = (ℓ−8)κ ℓ ℓ+4 . (Note that for ℓ > 8, д ℓ,Opt is not respectful, since lim x →0 R ′′ ℓ,Opt (x) = 0.) □ This proves the forward direction. Conversely, we claim that if f is nonconstant, f ′ (x) ≥ 0 everywhere, and f can be written in the stated form for some c 0 , c 1 , c 3 , . . . , then f is a proper scoring rule. We only have to verify that x f ′ (x) = (1 − x)f ′ (1 − x) everywhere (by Lemma 2.3 and Lemma D.1 (stated and proven below)). Taking the derivative of (1 − x)f ′ (1 − x) term by term, we have
Similarly, we have Proof of Lemma D.1. Let f be an infinitely differentiable scoring rule that is weakly proper but not proper. Recall that in the proof of Lemma 2.3, we showed that for all p, the associated reward function r p (x) weakly increases on (0, p] and weakly decreases on [p, 1). Since f is not proper, there is some p such that r p (x) does not strictly increase on (0, p] or does not strictly decrease on [p, 1). But this means that r p (x) is constant on some open interval, which means that r p (x) is constant (because f is infinitely differentiable, which means that r p (x) is also infinitely differentiable). Thus, for some c ∈ R we have that p f (x) + (1 − p)f (1 − x) = c for all x. Taking the derivative, we have that p f ′ (x) = (1 − p)f ′ (1 − x) for all x. But we also have that x f ′ (x) = (1 − x)f ′ (1 − x) for all x. The only way for both of these equations to hold is for f ′ (x) to be uniformly zero, so f is indeed constant. □
In proving Theorem 6.1, we will make substantial use of R ′′ , the second derivative of the reward function of f . For convenience, we will write ϕ instead of R ′′ . (1 − x) 2 ϕ(x)dx = 1.
We now prove Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The Weierstrass approximation theorem says that any continuous function can be uniformly approximated by polynomials on a closed interval. A constructive proof of this theorem (for the interval [0, 1]) is given by the Bernstein polynomials: b i,n (x) = n i x i (1 − x) n−i . Given a continuous function ψ : [0, 1] → R, define B n (ψ )(x) = n i=0 ψ i n b i,n (x).
Then the polynomials B n (ψ ) converge uniformly to ψ [Est98, §36]. Suppose that ψ also satisfies ψ (x) = ψ (1 − x). Then ψ i n = ψ n−i n , which means B n (ψ ) can be written as a linear combination of polynomials (b i,n + b n−i,n )(x). These polynomials are equal at x and 1 − x, and thus B n (ψ )(x) = B n (ψ )(1 − x). From this we conclude that ψ can be uniformly approximated on [0, 1] by a sequence polynomials p i that satisfy p i (x) = p i (1 − x).
Let ϕ ℓ be the ϕ corresponding to д ℓ,Opt . Recall that ϕ ℓ (x) = κ ℓ (x ℓ−8 (1 − x) ℓ ) 1/(ℓ+4) x ≤ 1 2 κ ℓ (x ℓ (1 − x) ℓ−8 ) 1/(ℓ+4) x ≥ 1 2 .
(4) Let 0 < ϵ < min( 1 2 , ϕ ℓ ( 1 2 )). Consider the following function ϕ ℓ,ϵ : [0, 1] → R.
Observe that ϕ ℓ,ϵ (x) = ϕ ℓ,ϵ (1 − x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]; this is a straightforward consequence of the fact that ϕ ℓ is symmetric about 1 2 . Per our discussion above, there exists a polynomial p ϵ satisfying p ϵ (x) = p ϵ (1 − x) such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], p ϵ (x) − ϕ ℓ,ϵ (x) ≤ ϵ. In particular, we take p ϵ = B n(ϵ ) (ϕ ℓ,ϵ ), where n(ϵ) is any n large enough that p ϵ is uniformly within ϵ of ϕ ℓ,ϵ .
Observe that such a polynomial, when written as a sum of powers of x − 1 2 , must only contain even powers of x − 1 2 , since p ϵ (x) − p ϵ (1 − x) must be the zero polynomial. Consequently, by Lemma 6.3, (1 − x)p ϵ (x) is the derivative of a proper scoring rule. 11 To find the associated normalized proper scoring rule (call it f ϵ ), we take the antiderivative (taking the constant coefficient in the x − 1 2expansion to be zero), and divide by ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x) 2 p ϵ (x)dx. Thus, corresponding to each ϵ we have a normalized polynomial scoring rule f ϵ with incentivization index
Ind ℓ (f ϵ ) = 2 ∫ 1 1 2
Claim D.2. f ϵ is respectful.
Proof. Since f ϵ is polynomial (and thus bounded and infinitely differentiable), it suffices to show that the second derivative of its reward function is bounded away from zero. The second derivative of f ϵ 's reward function is a positive multiple of p ϵ , so it suffices to show that p ϵ is bounded away from zero. This is indeed the case. To see this, note that ϕ ℓ,ϵ is bounded away from zero (as ϕ ℓ is bounded away from zero on [ϵ, 1 − ϵ]); let L > 0 be such that ϕ ℓ,ϵ (x) ≥ L on [0, 1]. Then 
□
Our goal is to upper bound Ind ℓ (f ϵ ) in a way that shows that lim ϵ →0 Ind ℓ (f ϵ ) = Ind ℓ (д ℓ,Opt ). To do this, it suffices to show that the first of the two integrals in our formula for f ϵ converges to 1 as ϵ → 0 and that twice the second integral converges to Ind ℓ (д ℓ , Opt) as ϵ → 0. We begin by working with the first of the two integrals. (1 − x) 2 p ϵ (x)dx ≤ 1.
Proof. First observe that, since д ℓ,Opt is normalized, we have ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x) 2 ϕ ℓ (x)dx = 1. Next, note that for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 8, ϕ ℓ is increasing on [ 1 2 , 1) (as is evident from Equation 4), which means that ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x) 2 ϕ ℓ,ϵ (x)dx ≤ ∫ 1 1 2
(1 − x) 2 ϕ ℓ (x)dx = 1.
(1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 8) 11 The fact that p ϵ is nonnegative everywhere follows from the fact that it is a uniform ϵ -approximation of ϕ ℓ, ϵ , which is greater than 1 on [0, 1].
It therefore follows that lim sup ϵ →0 Ind ℓ (f ϵ ) ≤ Ind ℓ (д ℓ,Opt ). But in fact, the inequality is an equality; this is because no continuously differentiable function has incentivization index less than that of д ℓ,Opt . This completes the proof of Theorem 6.1. □
E. Simulation Results
The table below summarizes the results of a quick simulation for ℓ = 1. Note that "predicted average error" simply means the error that Theorem 3.3 predicts in the limit as c approaches 0 (but multiplied by c −1/4 in the stated value of c). "Ratio" refers to the ratio between the average error and the predicted average error. "Maximum number of flips" refers to the maximum number of flips for that cost and rule in the 100, 000 simulations. (Note that because of the large number of simulations and comparatively small number of flips, these are likely to be universal upper bounds on the number of flips given that cost and rule.) 
